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Subjects in Santa Barbara, California, and Groningen, The Netherlands, par-
ticipated in a seven-person social dilemma game, presented in terms of a con-
servation of resources problem. Prior to their decision making in the social
dilemma game, subject's social motive (altruistic, cooperative, individualistic,
competitive) was assessed by means of two different classification procedures.
On the basis of previous research findings American subjects were expected to
display relatively more competitive social motives, and Dutch subjects relatively
more cooperative ones. However, no indications of crosscultural differences were
found neither with regard to the distribution of social motives nor with regard
to the amount of resources taken for self in the social dilemma game. In both
locations, competitive subjects took most resources for self, individualistic subjects
took next most, cooperative subjects took less than individualists, and altruistic
subjects took the least. In addition to predictive validity, indices of the convergent
validity of two social motive assessment procedures were described. © 1985
Academic Press, Inc.
During the forest fires in southern California in autumn 1980, the fire
department asked residents living in the threatened areas not to soak
their houses and property; otherwise, there would not be enough water
pressure for the fire department. The conflict in this emergency situation
is that the individual resident's immediate benefit, presumably saving his
or her own house, directly opposes the collective benefit for the threatened
area, namely, eliminating the threat of fire for all residents. Moreover,
the gain obtained from the selfish act—using water—is realized only by
the person himself or herself, while the harm resulting from this act-
loss of water pressure—is shared by all persons involved, including the
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actor. Hence, an individual resident may be inclined to use water. However,
if everybody acts this way, the result is that the water pressure will, as
a consequence, decrease to such a level that the individual residents
cannot soak their houses and, moreover, the fire department cannot
extinguish the fire, a tragic result for everybody. Hence, the people in
the threatened areas faced what has come to be known as a social
dilemma.
It is likely that not everybody would react in the same way to such
social dilemma situations (Dawes, 1980; Hardin, 1968). Some people
possibly would care only about their own short-term benefit, and soak
their houses, while others would take the long-term, collective interest
into account by not using water. In general terms, people may have
different preferences for distributions of benefits among themselves and
others. In the literature about behavior in situations of social interde-
pendence, these preferences are called social motives (McClintock, 1972),
interpersonal motivations (Griesinger & Livingston, 1973), motivational
orientations (Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975a, 1975b), or value orientations
(Liebrand, 1983). Here, the expression "social motives" will be used.
McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman, and Campos (1973), among others,
have assumed that "much of the choice behavior occurring in situations
of social interdependence is in the service of . . . three major social
motives: (a) maximizing own gain, (b) maximizing joint gain, and (c)
maximizing outcomes relative to the outcomes of others (relative gain)"
(p. 572). The first two goals can be respectively labeled as "individualism"
and "cooperation," the third as "competition." In addition to the above
three social motives, Kuhlman and Marshello (1975a, 1975b) found a
fourth group of subjects who appeared to be maximizing others' gain
("altruism"). More recently there have been some approaches which
suggest an even finer discrimination of social motives (Knight & Dubro,
1984; MacCrimmon & Messick, 1976; Radzicki, 1976). These approaches
use linear and nonlinear combinations of subject's preferences for own
and others' outcomes. In the present study, however, the broader distinction
into four classes of social motives will be sufficient.
Different procedures have been used for measuring social motives. As
Knight and Dubro (1984) point out, most of the early measures were
based on the observation of social interaction in small groups. However,
in order to minimize the role of group processes and strategic behaviors,
more recently measurement techniques using Decomposed Games have
been used (Griesinger & Livingston, 1973; Knight & Kagan, 1981; Kuhlman
& Marshello, 1975b; Liebrand, 1983). The person's task in a Decomposed
Game is to select the most preferred of n own/other outcome distributions.
Each distribution affords a payoff to the chooser and to another person.
Generally, the other person's choices remain unknown to the chooser,
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so that considerations of strategy can be avoided (Messick & McClintock,
1968).
In the present study the predictive validity of the social motive measures
is examined by investigating the decisional behavior of subjects with
different social motives in a simulated social dilemma called the Sequence
Dilemma (Liebrand, 1983).
In this task, each individual in a group of seven subjects can privately
take resources out of a common pool on five successive trials. The
subjects get to keep the money they take so long as the total amount
requested by the seven subjects does not exceed the amount in the pool.
In that event the subjects get nothing.
The Sequence Dilemma is clearly a social dilemma. Taking a great
deal of money from the resource pool is in the individual's short-term
interest, while the collective, long-term interest requires moderation in
order to remain within the limit.
The predictive validity of social motive measures can be assessed by
comparing subjects' behavior in the Sequence Dilemma to their measured
social motives. Only one previous study (Liebrand, 1984) reported an
effect of social motives on choice behavior in an n-person game and that
study used only one measurement technique in one location. The present
study can be regarded as an extension of the Liebrand (1984) study. It
is expected that the amount of money taken for self in the Sequence
Dilemma is least for altruists, next lowest for cooperators, higher yet
for individualists and greatest for competitors. The prediction concerning
the order among the altruists, cooperators, and individualists is straight-
forward. The difference between the individualists and competitors might
be less clear. It is expected that individualists would take less than
competitors because the risk of exceeding the limit, resulting in zero
payoffs to all group members, would be more aversive to individualists
than to competitors. Hence individualists should exercise more restraint.
In the present research, the distribution and predictive validity of social
motives in the Sequence Dilemma will be investigated in two samples
of subjects drawn from two different social milieus: one sample out of
the subject population availabie at the laboratory in Groningen, The
Netherlands, the other from the United States.
Intuitive comparisons of the American and the Dutch societies would
probably classify the American society as the more competitive and the
Dutch society as the more cooperative. Although the research findings
are not conclusive, support for this stereotype can be found from two
different lines of research. The first contains studies in which an explicit
American–Dutch contrast is employed (Kelley et al., 1970; Kerlinger,
1978; Kerlinger, Middendorp, & Amon, 1976). The second contains social
motive studies employing either American or Dutch subjects. Unfortu-
nately, these latter studies used two different procedures for the assessment
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of social motives, one procedure for the American subjects and the other
for Dutch subjects. The study described here integrates both lines of
research. It contrasts an American student sample with a Dutch student
sample and it employs, for both samples, both of the previously mentioned
procedures for aslessing social motives. In addition to the research question
pertaining to the predictive validity of the two assessment procedures,
their convergent validity is also analyzed.
Cross-cultural Research Findings
Thus far two relevant studies have been conducted in which an identical
research format was presented to American and Dutch subjects (Kelley
et al., 1970; Kerlinger, 1978; Kerlinger et al., 1976). Kerlinger (1978)
compared, among other subgroups, an American student sample and a
Dutch student sample. The American students were more conservative
and less socialistic as measured by a basic social attitude scale. In the
second study, Kelley et al. (1970) investigated negotiation behavior in a
mixed-motive situation. The study was conducted at three European and
five United States laboratories. One of the findings was that pregame
ratings of "typical player" and "self in the game" on the bipolar scale
"cooperative–competitive" had different connotative meanings across
the laboratories. That is, in four of the five United States laboratories
the cooperation–competition dimension was given a "dynamism" meaning:
weak and passive versus strong and active, respectively (cf. Osgood,
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). Of the three European laboratories, both
at the Belgian laboratory and at the French laboratory this dimension
was given an "evaluative" meaning: good versus bad, respectively. The
data from the Dutch laboratory revealed no substantial loadings on either
factor, indicating thereby a possibie difference between the United States
and the Dutch sample in the meaning given to the cooperation—competition
dimension.
Kerlinger (1978), Kerlinger et al. (1976), and the Kelley et al. (1970)
study have the advantage of a highly similar experimental task for American
and Dutch subjects. However, the findings have to be interpreted cau-
tiously. In the Kerlinger et al. (1976) study the Dutch student sample
consisted largely of politically left-oriented students. In the Kelley et al.
(1970) study different recruitment procedures were used for the various
subject samples. Consequently, between-sample differences are confounded
with possibie between-recruitment differences, differences in political
orientation, age, and socioeconomic background.
The second line of research consists of studies in which the assessment
of social motives by means of Decomposed Games was part of the
experimental procedure. Liebrand and De Hullu (1981) have reviewed
studies conducted either in the United States or in The Netherlands, in
which two different Decomposed Games procedures were employed to
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assess social motives. Six studies were examined, four conducted in the
United States and two in The Netherlands (see Tabie 1). Even acknowl-
edging objections against comparing the U.S. data with the Dutch data,
it appears from Tabie 1 that the percentage of American subjects classified
as cooperative is about half the percentage found for the Dutch subjects.
More subjects appear to be classified as either altruistic or competitive
in the United States than in The Netherlands.
It is possibie that the cross-cultural differences in Tabie 1 are due to
different experimental procedures used in the measurement of social
motives. All the U.S. studies used a procedure developed by Kuhlman
and Marshello, whereas the Dutch studies used a geometric procedure
(Liebrand, 1984). This possibility can be tested by giving both procedures
to subjects in both cultures. The two groups of studies also differed in
recruitment procedures. The U.S. studies used volunteer subjects and
the Dutch studies used paid subjects.
In the present study, we hope to determine if the distribution of social
motives in an American sample differs from that in a Dutch sample when
hoiding constant the measurement and recruitment procedures and second,
whether the same relationship between social motives and choice behavior
holds in both samples.
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects, 270 volunteers responding to an advertisement in a local university newspaper,
were recruited from the local university population at Santa Barbara, California (56 males,
75 females, mean age = 21.9) and from the local university population at Groningen, The
Netherlands (66 males, 73 females, mean age = 21.5). Subjects were randomly assigned
to 40 decision-making groups, each group consisting of either six or seven persons. They
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGES OF SUBJECTS CLASSIFIED AS "ALTRUISTIC," "COOPERATIVE," "INDIVIDUALISTIC," OR














Altruistic 9 11 11 18 4 5
Cooperative 17 28 30 15 45 53
Individualistic 23 26 26 11 27 29
Competitive 28 21 18 12 10 10
Other 23 14 15 44 14 4
Total number
of subjects 205 167 128 98 132 122
° The studies by Liebrand were done in The Netherlands; all others were done in the Unite
States.
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were not allowed to discuss the dilemma. Subjects received the total amount of money
they had chosen in the Sequence Dilemma only if the requirements were met, otherwise
the American subjects received a consolation payment of $1.50 per hour, the Dutch subjects
received fi 3.
One of the possible interpretations for the distributional differences in social motives
obtained between the United States and The Netherlands (Table 1) is the type of Decomposed
Game procedure used at both locations. In order to investigate this explanation, a multimethod
design was used. The subject's social motive was assessed by means of two independent
Decomposed Game procedures, i.e., the modified Griesinger and Livingston procedure
used in the European studies in Table 1, and the Kuhlman and Marshello (19756) procedure
used in the four American studies in Table I. These will be described presently.
Procedure
In order to increase the procedural comparability, the first author was the principal
experimenter at both locations. The extensive instructions for both the Decomposed Game
procedures as weIl as for the Sequence Dilemma procedure were presented in writing to
the subjects. In the rare case when oral instructions were required, for example, "please
make your choices for the first stage," the subjects were addressed by a native-speaking
research assistant.
During the first part of the session, subjects were seated so that they could not see each
others' response sheets. In a counterbalanced design, subjects received instructions for
the two Decomposed Games procedures, instructions that thoroughly explained how the
subjects' outcomes were determined by both their own choices and the choices of another
subject. The other subject was identified only as a person who would remain unknown
and who had been randomly selected, separately for each Decomposed Game, out of the
subject population to which they belonged themselves. Instructions were kept neutral. No
reference was given concerning the desirability of obtaining specific outcome distributions.
Kuhlman and Marshello's Decomposed Game procedure. Kuhlman and Marshello's
procedure consists of two identical sets of 12 three-alternative Decomposed Games, designed
to assess the social motives "altruism" (A), "cooperation" (J), "individualism" (I), and
"competition" (R). Each Decomposed Game is one of the following four types: 1: a-IR,
b-JA, c-N; 2: a-IJA, b-R, c-N; 3: a-I, b-R, c-JA; 4: a-IRJ, b-A, c-N. The notation indicates
the dominant alternative with respect to a social motive. For example, the a-IR, b-JA, c-
N type indicates that individualistic and competitive motives lead to the selection of
alternative a, that alternative b is dominant for cooperative and altruistic motives, and
that alternative c is supposed to be neutral (N) to each of the social motives. Except for
one game,- the numerical outcomes of all the 24 Decomposed Games can be found in
Kuhlman and Marshello (1975b). The numerical outcomes of alternative c in the game:
self: a-90, b-70, c-60; other: a-10, b-20, c-20, were changed into self: c-60, other: c-10, so
as to make alternative b dominant with respect to altruism.
Following Kuhlman and Marshello (1975b), subjects were paid a small amount of money
based on the total number of points they accumulated as a result of their choices. They
received 5 U.S. cents for each 100 points; the maximum amount of money paid for
participating in the Kuhlman and Marshello procedure was $1.30.
Subject's choices were converted to scores on four scales, one for each social motive.
Each time the subject selected an alternative prescribed by one or more of the social
motives, a score of + 1 was added to the corresponding scale(s). Again, following Kuhlman
and Marshello (1975b), subjects were classified according to their highest scale score,
provided that within each type of game at least 50% of their choices were consistent with
a single social motive. Partly because of the redundancy between scales, in the present
study, 20 subjects made choices that were equally consistent with two social motives. In
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such cases, the motive representing the less concern for others' outcomes was assigned.
In total 86% of the 270 subjects could thus be classified.
The geometric Decomposed Games procedure. The geometric procedure (see Liebrand,
1984) consisted of 32 two-choice Decomposed Games. The options in these games may
be viewed as points in an own/other outcome plane defined by the outcome to self (horizontal
axis) and the outcomes to the other (vertical axis). Each of the 32 games consisted of a
pair of two adjacent points: 16 equally spaced pairs lay on Circle A and 16 equally spaced
pairs lay on Circle B in the own/other outcome plane depicted in Fig. 1. The center of
both the circles coincided with the origin of the outcome plane; the radius was $7.00 for
Circle A and $8.50 for Circle B. An example of a Decomposed Game on Circle B is the
choice between the point $3.30 for self and $7.90 for the other, versus $6.00 for self and
$6.00 for the other. For each game, the subjects selected the point they preferred most.
Adding up the chosen amounts separately for self and for other yields an estimate of
the weights assigned by the subject to the payoff for self and to the payoff for other. These
weights estimate the slope of subject's motivational vector extending from the origin from
the self/other outcome plane. All motivational vectors between 112.5 and 67.5° (Fig. 1)
were labeled altruistic, vectors between 67.5 and 22.5° were labeled cooperative, those
between 22.5 and 337.5° were labeled individualistic, and vectors between 337.5 and 292.5°
were labeled competitive. Using the geometric procedure, 98% of the 270 subjects could
be classified.
Procedure for the Sequence Dilemma. After subjects had made their choices for both
Decomposed Games procedures, they received the instructions for the Sequence Dilemma.
Thereafter, a quiz was administered to ensure complete understanding of this task, and
any incorrect answers were corrected and explained. During the task, subjects were seated
in a circular pattern behind small screens which prevented them from seeing each others'
response sheets, while at the same time permitting them to see each other. The structure
of the Sequence Dilemma was explained in terms of a conservation of energy paradigm
in order to make the abstract characteristics of the task more concrete and realistic.
FIG. 1. Own–other outcome space. Q(1) to Q(4) = Quadrant 1 to Quadrant 4; Circle
A radius = $7.00; Circle B radius = $8.50.
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The subjects had to select one of five options at each of five stages. The options involved
the consumption of energy which was expressed in monetary units: Option 1: $9.00; Option
2: $6.00; Option 3: $4.50; Option 4: $3.00; Option 5: $1.50. No reference was given to the
desirability of selecting options in a specific way.
Subjects were told that the stages corresponded to time and that the total amount of
energy resource (money) available across the five periods would be $95, $100, $105, $110,
or $115 (see Fig. 2; for the six-person groups these pool sizes were adjusted to fall between
$80 and $100). Subjects were informed that each pool size had a probability of .2, and
would be randomly determined after the decisions for all five stages had been made. They
were told that they were making real monetary decisions and that they would be paid the
money they had taken for self, if the total amount chosen in their group did not exceed
the pool size drawn.
After each decision-making period, subjects were informed concerning the total amount
of money taken. No information was given concerning the amount taken by individual
subjects.
RESULTS
The Two Decomposed Games Procedures
There are several ways to estimate the internal consistency of the two
Decomposed Games Procedures used to assess the subjects' social motive.
First, the percentage of choices consistent with the social motive assigned
can be calculated. For the three-alternative Kuhlman and Marshello pro-
cedure this percentage is 87; for the two-alternative geometric procedure
this percentage is 84. However, making choices in a completely random
way results in consistency percentages of 33 and 50, respectively. Since
both procedures consist of two Aarts, the Spearman–Brown index for
reliability can be calculated. The Spearman–Brown coefficient for the   













Fin. 2. Possible outcomes for the Sequence Dilemma for seven persons given five
stages where the minimal amount of money for each person per stage is $1.50 and the
maximum is $9.00. a. cumulative minimal amount of money across choosers at each stage;
c. cumulative maximal amount of money across choosers; b. possible cumulation curve.
S(low). lowest resource pool size; S(high). highest resource pool size.
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Kuhlman and Marshello procedure averaged over the four scales is .93
(N = 270); the corresponding index over the two axes for the geometric
procedure is .88 (N = 270).
To estimate the convergent validity between the two measures we first
computed the correlation between the own outcome weight in the geometric
procedure and the I-scale magnitude from the Kuhlman–Marshello pro-
cedure (.46), and that between the other outcome weight and the A-scale
magnitude, respectively (.54). Both are highly significant, suggesting that
the two procedures are measuring similar tendencies.
In Tabie 2 the proportion of agreement between the nominal scales of
both procedures is shown. Using the disagreement weights, 0 (diagonal),
1 (adjacent diagonals), 4 (next diagonals), and 9 (upper right and lower
left corner), the weighted K coefficient (Cohen, 1968), is .54 (95% confidence
limits are .45 and .63). The main difference between the classification
procedures is that the Kuhlman–Marshello procedure classifies 61 of the
subjects as altruists, while the geometric procedure results in only 10
subjects so classified. The latter procedure classified more subjects as
cooperative (130) than the former. Of the 10 subjects who were classified
as altruistic by the geometric procedure, 9 were also classified that way
by Kuhlman–Marshello. This suggests that the main difference between
the procedures is that the geometric procedure sets a higher or more
stringent criterion than the Kuhlman–Marshello technique for the clas-
sification as an altruist. If the altruists and cooperators are combined
into a single category, then the agreement between the procedures is
extremely high, i.e., 172 of 236 cases or 73% agreement.
Culture Differences in Social Motives
The hypothesis that there are differences in social motives between
American and Dutch subjects was analyzed by means of X 2 tests. The
culture x social motive classification is presented in Tabie 3. The obtained
x2' s provide no support for the cultural differences hypothesis; for the
TABLE 2
CROSS TABULATION OF THE CLASSIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY THE GEOMETRIC PROCEDURE AND
THE KUHLMAN AND MARSHELLO PROCEDURE
Kuhlman and Marshello
A J I R Total
Geometric A 9 0 1 0 10
procedure J 48 64 16 2 130
I 3 29 41 5 78
R 1 2 5 10 18
Total 61 95 63 17 236
Note. A = altruism; J = cooperation; I = individualism; R = competition.
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TABLE 3
CROSS TABULATION OF SUBJECTS CLASSIFIED BY MEANS OF BOTH DECOMPOSED GAMES
PROCEDURES, BROKEN DOWN FOR CULTURE
Altruistic	 Cooperative	 Individualistic
	 Competitive	 Total
Netherlands 4; 27 53; 37 33; 27 10; 9 136; 126
United States 5; 25 55; 44 35; 26 5; 5 128; 113
Total I1; 63 143; 95 91; 64 19; 17 264; 239
Note. Entries are percentages of row totals; the first one refers to the geometric procedure.
geometric procedure x2(3, N = 264) = 2.5 (n.s.), for the Kuhlman–
Marshello Procedure x 2(3, N = 239) = 2.9 (n.s.). In addition, no cultural
differences were found in scores on the two continuous variabies resulting
from the geometric procedure. For American subjects the mean on the
variabie corresponding to concern for own outcomes is 19.07, while the
mean for Dutch subjects is 19.97. The means on the variabie corresponding
to concern for others' outcomes were 9.92, and 8.07, respectively. A
multivariate analysis of variance with the two geometric procedure variabies
as dependent variabies and culture as the between-subjects factor yielded
no significant univariate or multivariate effects (F(2, 265) = 1.57). To
summarize, no differences were found between American and Dutch
subjects in the distribution of social motives.
In addition, we examined possible gender differences in the distribution
of social motives. No significant differences were obtained: x 2(3, N =
264) = .98 (n.s.) for the geometric procedure and x 2(3, N = 239) =
5.41 (n.s.) for the Kuhlman–Marshello procedure. The only noticeabie
distributional difference was that Kuhlman–Marshello classified as altruistic
twice as many females as males (42 vs 21).
Effects of Social Motive, Culture, and Sex on Choices in the Sequence
Dilemma
In the analysis of the effect of culture and social motive on subjects'
resource choices, the variation due to differences between the 40 decision-
making groups (MS–A), and the groups x social motive interaction (MS–
AB), were found to yield F ratios failing to reach the .10 level of significance.
Consequently, in the partially hierarchical design in which groups were
nested within culture (Winer, 1962, p. 184), the MS–A and MS–AB were
pooled with the within-groups mean square to create a pooled error term.
The resulting test yielded a significant effect for social motives, both
when the geometric procedure was used (F(3, 256) = 4.77, p < .05),
and with the Kuhlman and Marshello procedure (F(3, 231) = 5.67, p <
.05). The effect for culture and the culture x social motive interaction
were insignificant and accounted for virtually no variance.
As can be seen in Table 4, altruistic subjects took the smallest amount
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TABLE 4
RESOURCE CHOICES BROKEN DOWN FOR SOCIAL MOTIVE AND CULTURE, SEPARATELY FOR THE
GEOMETRIC PROCEDURE (GP) AND FOR THE KUHLMAN-MARSHELLO (K&M) PROCEDURE
Culture
Social motive
Altruism Cooperation Individualism Competition
Netherlands
GP 12.90 13.89 15.90 16.50
K&M 13.06 14.90 16.50 15.00
United States
GP 13.50 13.89 15.26 17.50
K&M 13.14 14.29 15.85 18.30
of money, followed by the cooperators, next the individualists, while
the competitors took the most. There is only one exception. It concerns
the Dutch competitors classified by Kuhlman and Marshello's procedure.
The average amount of money chosen by the Dutch subjects was $14.73
(SD = 4.19), while the American subjects on the average chose $14.63
(SD = 4.82). An additional 2 x 2 univariate analysis of variance of the
amount chosen, with culture (Neth.–U.S.) and sex as the two between-
subjects factors, yielded no main effect for culture (F(1, 266) = .004),
nor a culture x sex interaction (F(1, 266) = .008). The main effect for
sex was significant (F(1, 266) = 5.97, p < .05). Males chose $15.42 for
self but females chose only $14.08. Thus, in the present research it
appears that females behave in a less self-interested way in a simulated
social dilemma than males.
Resource Choices Per Stage
Subject's resource choices per stage as a function of social motive
collapsed over culture are shown in Fig. 3. The five separate choices
were analyzed using an analysis of repeated measures model (Finn &
Mattson, 1978), with social motive classification as the between-subjects
factor and stages as the within-subjects variabie. Of the four polynomials
only the linear trend (F(1, 260) = 264.38, p < .0001) and the quadratic
trend (F(1, 260) = 39.13, p < .0001) yielded significant univariate and
multivariate effects (F(2, 259) = 134.10, p < .0001) for the geometric
procedure. The results for Kuhlman and Marshello's procedure were the
same. As is shown in Fig. 3, the resource choices of all subjects decreased
most during the first three trials, while there is only a small decrease
after the third trial. Furthermore, the linear trend x social motive in-
teraction was significant (F(3, 260) = 6.03, p < .0006, geometric procedure;
F(3, 235) = 3.86, p < .01, Kuhlman–Marshello procedure). It appears
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Geometric procedure K &M -procedure
2	3 4	5 2	3 4	5
Stages Stages
FIG. 3. Resource choices for four classes of social motivation x stage separately for
the geometric procedure and for Kuhlman and Marshello's procedure; COMP = competitive,
IND = individualistic, COOP = cooperative, ALT = altruistic.
stage 1, the differences between the four social motives are significant
(F(3, 260) = 7.8, p < .001, geometric procedure; F(3, 235) = 7.5, p <
.001, Kuhlman–Marshello procedure). At stage 5, however, there is no
significant social motive effect for either procedure. It seems that as
subjects approached the point at which they could lose everything, they
became more conservative. However, there is no indication that competitive
and individualistic subjects tried to compensate in this phase of the game
for their excessive choice behavior in the first trials.
The amount of money chosen as a function of stage of decision making,
broken down for culture and for sex, is shown in Fig. 4. The five resource
choices made by each subject were analyzed using a 2 x 2 analysis of
repeated measures model (Finn & Mattson, 1978), with culture and sex
as the two between-subjects factors and stages as the within-subjects
variabie. Aside from the significant univariate effect for the linear trend
(F(1, 266) = 251.4, p < .0001), for the quadratic trend (F(1, 266) =
35.11, p < .0001), and for their multivariate effect (F(2, 265) = 126.7,
p < .0001), only the first two polynomials x culture interaction (F(2,
265) = 8.65, p < .05), was significant.
The polynomials x culture interaction was analyzed in further detail













2	 3	 4	 5
stages
FIG. 4. Average amount of money chosen for self by stage, sex (male vs female), and
culture (Netherlands (Neth.) vs United States (USA)).
of the average choice for each stage) accounted for by the linear and
quadratic polynomial separately for each culture (Keppel, 1973). It appeared
that for the Dutch subjects the linear polynomial accounted for 89% and
the quadratic polynomial for 10% of the total effect variance. For the
American subjects, these proportions were 96 and 3%, respectively. It
seems that the Dutch subjects took somewhat more than the American
subjects in the beginning of the Sequence Dilemma and that toward the
end of the game they were more conservative than the American subjects.
DISCUSSION
Social Motives
The expectation that individual differences in social motives would be
related to choices in a social dilemma was strongly supported. The game
format used in the present study allowed subjects to compare their own
behavior with that of others. It appears that competitive and individualistic
subjects, while receiving information from which they could deduce that
they were taking more out of the common pool than the others in their
group, did not reduce their takings to such an extent that they could
compensate for their excessive takings in the beginning of the game. The
cooperative and altruistic subjects took somewhat less than the average
other in their group. With respect to both the n-person game format and
the subject populations under consideration, this finding is an important
extension of Kuhlman and Marshello's (1975) research on social motives.
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One question raised by Messick et al. (1983) is relevant to the present
findings. It concerns whether the observed differences between social
motives in social dilemma behavior reflect differences in a priori expec-
tations of reciprocity and differences in beliefs about how one should
use a common resource. As was said before, there is some evidence
(Kelley et al., 1970) that interdependency situations may be differently
defined by the subject. It can be interpreted as a situation in which one
could behave in either a "good" or "bad" way (evaluative meaning) or
in which one could behave in either a "strong" or "weak" way (dynamism
meaning). A study currently in progress investigates whether the above
differences in the definition of the interdependency situation are related
to social motives.
Prior research has indicated the existence of systematic preferences
for particular distributions of outcomes to self and other (Knight, 1981;
Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Liebrand, 1983; McClintock, 1972). The
present study also provides support for the convergent validity of the
two social motive assessment procedures used in prior research. However,
both procedures rely heavily on the same kind of behavioral choice
methodology (Knight, 1981). Consequently, the corresponding findings
may be method specific. In order to overcome this limitation, future
research should establish their correspondence with other types of social
motive methodologies.
Gender Differences
As in the two-person mixed-motive gaming research, we find inconsistent
sex effects. In both the present study and the Liebrand (1984) study it
was found that females chose less for self than males in the Sequence
Dilemma; however, there were no significant differences in the distribution
of social motives. In addition, Caldwell (1976) found no sex effect in a
five-person Prisoner's Dilemma in which subjects played for points, and
Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) found that females were more
likely to cooperate in only one of the reported commons dilemmas in
which they could earn real money. A tentative conclusion might be that
females are more cautious than males in n-person mixed-motive games
in which they can earn or lose real money.
Cultural Differences
Contrary to the expectations based on the studies of Kelley et al.
(1970), Kerlinger et al. (1976), Kerlinger (1978), and those depicted in
Tabie 1, no indications of cross-cultural differences were found with
regard to the distribution of social motives or to the amount taken in
the Social Dilemma Game. It is clear that differences in social milieu,
as well as differences in experimental procedures or in subject recruitment
procedures could account for the cultural differences obtained in prior
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research. The design of the present study permits a less ambiguous
interpretation. Since experimental and recruitment procedures were care-
fully equated, we may conclude that those aspects of the culture responsibie
for shaping undergraduate's social motives do not seem to differ from
Santa Barbara to Groningen. Hence, the cultural differences evident in
the studies in Tabie 1 are most likely artifactual, resulting from differences
in measurement and/or recruitment procedures.
First, the differences in experimental procedures between the American
and Dutch studies in Table 1 concern the type of Decomposed Games
procedures used. The differences between the methods is clearly evident
in Tabie 3. Within both cultures, the Kuhlman–Marshello procedure
classifies more subjects as altruistic and fewer subjects as cooperative
than the geometric procedure. Thus, when methods are crossed with
cultures we find that it is the methods, not the cultures, that are crucial.
The second source of bias consists of differences in recruitment pro-
cedures. In all the American studies listed in Table 1, subject participation
served as a partial fulfillment of an experimental participation requirement.
In contrast, in the present experiment, subjects were paid volunteers.
Consequently, there are differences with respect to incentive and to the
act of volunteering. Rosenthal and Rosnow (1969) point out that volunteers
more often than nonvolunteers tend to be approval seeking, authoritarian,
and sociabie. Though students required to serve as research subjects
cannot be considered nonvolunteers—they often have a choice among
alternative experiments—they cannot be considered true volunteers. In
terms of social motives, it might be that paid volunteers will have more
concern for others than subjects fulfilling course requirements. With
respect to the kind of incentive received, Kelley et al. (1970) point out
that the money incentive for the subjects of the present experiments may
have evoked a different definition of the experimental task with a cor-
responding difference in the behavioral norms considered to be appropriate.
In their experiment they found that subjects within the money condition
rated both self and the typical person as more honest and cooperative
than did subjects within the points condition.
More direct evidence that subject recruitment procedures affect the
distribution of social motives obtained comes from the results of a pilot
study conducted in Santa Barbara shortly before we carried out the
present experiment (van Run, 1982). In that study, 71 undergraduates
participated to fulfill course requirements. The average score on the
variabie corresponding with concern for others' outcomes, as measured
by the geometric procedure, was about one half as great in the pilot
study as in the Santa Barbara condition of the present experiment (t(200)
= 2.87, p < .05). There was no significant difference in average score
on the variabie concern for own outcomes between the two groups. Still
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the general implication of these results is that what appear to be cultural
differences may in fact be due to minor procedural differences.
The results of this study allow us to place great confidence in the
relationship we reported between choice behavior in the social dilemma
and social motives. The relationship was found both in the United States
and in The Netherlands and it was found with both methods of measuring
social motives, despite their clear differences.
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